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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
III. CIVIL CODE AND RELATED SUBJECTS
SuccEssIoNs, DONATIONS AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Harriet S. Daggett*
WILLS
The sisters of testator brought suit to set aside the will of
their brother in Lee v. Hunter' because he had left his property
to the wife and children of his predeceased son who was an
adulterous illegitimate. The ground of attack under Article 1491
was that the legatees were "persons interposed" in lieu of the
one incapable of receiving. Since the son had died before the
will was drawn there could be no thought of interposition where-
by he might eventually inherit. Furthermore the court pointed
out that the code merely speaks of certain persons as being "re-
puted" interposed-a presumption which may be rebutted. No
authority whatever was found to support the idea that the legi-
timate children of an illegitimate might not receive from the
illegitimate's parent under the conditions of this case. This de-
cision follows the modem social policy of the court in making
the burdens of illegitimates no heavier than they already are.
A sister and the nieces and nephews of decedent sued to
declare invalid the olographic will of their brother and uncle in
Succession of Buck.2 The first ground was in regard to the mental
capacity of decedent at the time the will in question was made.
There was a great deal of conflicting evidence and witnesses of
high repute, laymen and professionals, were found on both sides
of the question. The court found that the insanity was not estab-
lished "with sufficient certainty to justify annulling the instru-
ment on that ground."8 There was also grave doubt as to the
physical ability of testator to write the will and evidence of a
most convincing nature was adduced to show that he had for
many years been unable to write anything but his name. The
definite ground upon which the will was declared invalid was
that the date was uncertain, which rendered the instrument un-
dated and hence invalid under 1588. Copious authority was cited.
Justice Spofford's comment in Johnson v. Bloodworth4 was repro-
duced by Chief Justice O'Niell, a famous French scholar, and may
* Professor of Civil Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 208 La. 248, 23 So.(2d) 61 (1945).
2. 208 La. 556, 23 So.(2d) 215 (1945).
3. 208 La. 556, 568, 23 So.(2d) 215, 219.
4. 12 La. Ann. 699 (1857).
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well be again emphasized here. After reviewing the French
authorities Justice Spofford said:
"'When jurists of a race so much addicted to theoretical specu-
lation, and so little addicted to reverence for each other's
opinions, draw a conclusion from the Code in which they
unanimously concur, we may, perhaps, set it down for an
obvious truth.' ,,5
Interpretation of a will is the concern of the court in Succes-
sion of Fertel.6 The document appears as follows:
"'1st January 1936.
"'My Last Will
"'Everything I possess. I leave (the use of it to my hus-
band during his life time, at his death it goes as following.
"'To my 2 daughters Nettie and Annie and to my grand
son Rodney Fertel Weinberg.
"'To my son Barney Fertel I leave One hunderd dollars per
month for the maintenance during his life time only to be
paid out of the Estate.
"'None of the properties cannot be sold or mortgaged,
twenty years from hence.
"'This will includes my box at the Bank of Commerce N 0.
"'Julia Fertel' '"
The majority of the court held that the will did not contain a
substitution prohibited by Article 1520. The clause restricting
sale or mortgage was reputed as not written. This decision was
said by the majority to be closely analogous to that in Succession
of Blossom.8 Justice Fournet dissented and pointed out the many
reversals in connection with this matter. He expressed the view
that only by strict adherence to the articles of the code guiding
interpretation of wills could this uncertainty of outcome be
avoided. His thought was that Article 1712 in particular had not
been adhered to and that the controlling opinion "not only re-
writes the will but that this resulting version is not in keeping
with the intention of the testatrix as reflected by the will."' The
petition for rehearing, however, was denied by the whole court.
The second point of controversy after declaration of validity
5. 208 La. 556, 584, 23 So.(2d) 215, 224 (1945).
6. 208 La. 614, 23 So.(2d) 234 (1945).
7. 208 La. 614, 618, 23 So.(2d) 234, 235.
8. 194 La. 635, 194 So. 572 (1940).
9. 208 La. 614, 646, 23 So.(2d) 234, 244 (1945).
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was the division of the estate. The suit had been brought by
Barney Fertel, the son of testatrix to whom she had left one
hundred dollars per month. The majority of the court took the
position that she had intended to disinherit her son. Obviously
his legitime must be protected, in which the court included the
one hundred dollars per month and allocated to him his one-
third of two-thirds or two-ninths or six twenty-sevenths of the
whole estate. The court then said that the testatrix had intended
to favor the two daughters and the grandson, not an heir, of
course, since his mother, testatrix's daughter, was living. These
three were each given one-third of the remaining 21/27 or 7/29
each. The chief justice while concurring in the judgment ex-
pressed doubt in regard to this division. His thought was that the
two daughters should receive their legitime plus one-third of the
disposable portion, particularly since that result would have
been to give each daughter one-third of the estate, which the
will provided and which they also would have received had the
mother died intestate. Justice Fournet's view was that the will
did not indicate that the testatrix intended to disinherit her son
and that it was very doubtful that she intended her two daughters
to receive less than they would had she died intestate, in order
that the grandson should be favored.
The pertinent facts of the controversy in Succession of Quin-
tero10 were that the testatrix had established certain "particular
legacies of . . . particular objects" among which was a bequest
of "20 shares of stock of the Times-Picayune Publishing Co."
After the will was made but before the death of the testatrix
the Times-Picayune Publishing Company declared a stock divi-
dend and twenty more shares were allocated to testatrix. The
question presented was whether or not the particular legatee of
the original twenty shares should have the additional shares
constituting the dividend. The supreme court heard the case
twice and decided twice that the testatrix's intention was for
the particular legatee to have her incorporeal right against the
publishing company which the certificates (regardless of their
number) represented. The court was divided on both hearings
and Justice Fournet twice wrote a dissenting opinion. His view
was that it was clear that the testatrix intended to give but
twenty shares of the stock and that the pertinent articles of the
code on particular legacies had been violated by the majority
decision. It was conceded that had the dividend been in cash
10. 209 La. 279, 24 So.(2d) 589 (1945).
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rather than stock, the addition would not have gone to the par-
ticular legatee. This point, overwhelmingly supported by au-
thority, was most convincingly made by Justice Fournet.
In Artigue v. Artigue11 the supreme court approved the trial
judge's finding that a preponderance of the evidence showed
the decedent to have been insane before, during and after the
making of the will in question. The author of the opinion spoke
of the strong presumption in favor of validity of a will and re-
marked that "a review of the jurisprudence of this court discloses
the evidence has been found sufficient to warrant the annull-
ment of the will under attack in only a few instances.
1 2
It appeared, however, that the decedent had been brought
to the notary and had merely "repeated the words parrot-like
after the notary"13 which together with strong evidence of in-
curable insanity of the type devoid of lucid intervals plainly
showed lack of capacity.
One of the three children sought to invalidate the mystic will
of her father in Succession of Fertel'4 The first point of attack
was that the will had not been properly sealed, namely by use of
a "signet ring or other device, upon sealing wax or the like." The
envelope in which the will was contained was sealed with muci-
lage in the ordinary manner and the flap was further secured by
means of a sealing wafer. There was no evidence that the envel-
ope had been opened or the will disturbed. The court stated that
the law provided no specific manner of sealing and that the
means used was sufficient. The second point of attack was that
the notary's superscription stated that the will had been pre-
sented "in the presence of rather than to the witnesses." The
court held that there had been a substantial compliance with the
code and cited previous cases holding that an "actual manual
presentation is not sacramental."
Having found the will valid in form, the court next con-
sidered the alternative pleas. One having no support in evidence
or otherwise, the court considered the second which was that
the computation of the forced share was improper. In short, the
plaintiff wished to be relieved of collation as indicated by the
testator and also have the forced share computed as though she
were claiming originally her forced portion. Obviously she could
11. 210 La. 208, 26 So.(2d) 699 (1946).
12. 26 So.(2d) 699, 701 (La. 1946).
13. 26 So.(2d) 699, 703.
14. 209 La. 655, 25 So.(2d) 296 (1946).
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not have both, and having claimed the advantages of the will,
she could not complain of the computation of the forced share
as though she was demanding her legitime in lieu of the advan-
tage of the will.
DONATIONS INTER VIVOS
The Succession of Gorman" presents an interesting analysis
in regard to the validity of a gift inter vivos. A power of attorney
was granted that this agent might withdraw funds from the
bank for payment of certain bills of the principal. A statement
was made by the principal in the presence of a witness that the
agent was to keep the balance of the fund after these bills were
paid. The court held that this balance was manually donated.
The decision appears to have been correctly made with no vio-
lence to the law on the form for a gift of incorporeal rights.
It was not the right to withdraw the fund that was donated
manually but the gift of the corporeal, already in the hands of
the donee, who gained possession by means of the power of at-
torney. A note on this case appears in this Review and further
discussion might be repetitious.
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
The court commented upon the sad situation evidenced in
Succession of Russell17 where a father and three children were
"arrayed in the forum" against the other three children in a
contest over the deceased wife and mother's half of the com-
munity. The supreme court properly relied upon the district
judge's estimate of credibility of witnesses particularly where
so much bitterness was displayed. Homologation of the father's
final account as administrator was at issue. The community
property was sold to pay debts. Court costs, administrator's fees,
attorneys' fees, insurance, taxes and certain promissory notes
were charged to the mass. One-half was then credited to the
father. The other half was charged with the mother's succession
costs such as the expenses of last illness and funeral. The remain-
der was credited to the children burdened with the father's usu-
fruct. Special attorneys employed by the children were to be paid
by them. The failure to advertise some of the property as directed
by Article 1184 was not fatal as notice was had and contest heard
on the items.
15. 209 La. 1092, 26 So.(2d) 150 (1946).
16. Note (1946) 7 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 144.
17. 208 La. 213, 23 So.(2d) 50 (1945).
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A testator left the naked ownership of all his property,
separate and community, to his two sisters with usufruct thereof
to his wife, who was made testamentary executrix. The accuracy
of the final account of the executrix was at issue in Succession
of Singer.18 The executrix had found it necessary to sell some of
the separate property and some of the community property in
order to pay the debts of the succession. Public and private sales
were conducted with proper legal formalities. A residue in cash
was left from these sales after the debts were paid, and the exe-
cutrix claimed the sum in usufruct under the will. Opponents
maintained that she had waived the usufruct in her petition to
sell the property. The court held that she had merely waived her
usufruct of the property itself in order that it might be sold to
better advantage unburdened with a usufruct. No express re-
nunciation of usufruct per se as required by Article 624 of the
code was found and the action of the executrix, legatee of the
usufruct, was in accord with the provisions of Articles 584 and
585. Since the testator did not provide that the executrix was to
receive a fee over and above her legacy she was not entitled to
one under Article 1686 and settled jurisprudence. The executrix
had improperly listed improvements made with community funds
upon separate property as community property when the whole
should have been listed as separate property. The amount of the
debt due by the separate estate to the community under 2408
was indeterminable from the record so the court remanded the
case that this item might be ascertained and the account recast.
Plaintiffs were the two sons of deceased by his first marriage,
which had been dissolved by divorce. They sought in Succession
of Hollander9 to have a judgment sustaining an exception of no
cause of action annulled in which they were successful in part.
The plaintiffs claimed that the marriage contract between their
father and his second wife was in fraud of their rights, and
furthermore that since income tax returns had been made on a
community basis that an estoppel had been created whereby the
marriage contract declaring against a community could not be
urged. The marriage contract was found to have been a lawful
instrument; no fraud was proved, hence the court could not
annul the contract. The matter of income tax was said to have
no bearing on the issues involved. So far as real property in the
name of the second wife was concerned, the plaintiffs' remedy
18. 208 La. 463, 23 So. (2d) 184 (1945).
19. 208 La. 1038, 24 So.(2d) 69 (1945).
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was to sue for the return of the purchase money used by the
father and not to have the realty, never in the name of the
father, returned to the succession. However, the plaintiffs did
have a right to use parol evidence to have the stock, personal
property, bought by their father but placed in the name of the
second wife, brought back into the succession if proven a simu-
lated transaction in fraud of their rights.20
Rousseau v. Rousseau21 reiterates two well established prin-
ciples of community property law: one, that the wife can prove
de hors the deed that realty is her separate property-two, that
the husband is estopped to deny that property is separate to his
wife if he has joined in the instrument which so declares. The
husband was also unable to recover title under theory of mis-
take of fact or law and this phase of the case will be discussed
under appropriate title of this r6sum6.
Several most interesting questions dealing with settlement
between separate and community estates were discussed in
Succession of Ratcliff,2 2 having been raised by opposition to
the first annual account filed by the executors of Ratcliff. The
decedent was survived by his third wife and by two children,
issue of the first two marriages. The first disputed item con-
sidered by the court was one month's salary paid by the company
of which decedent had been president. Mr. Ratcliff had actually
earned but six days of the thirty-one for which payment was
made. The executors had allocated 6/31 to the community and
the balance to the separate estate under the theory that the part
not actually earned was a gift. The supreme court, sustaining
the district court, ruled against the executor on this point, noting
that withholding tax had been subtracted on the total, which
was only proper in earnings, that the amount was identical with
the regular monthly salary checks, that if the executors could
not regard the sum as earnings they should return it to the
company as having been paid in error. Certainly there was no
label of gift placed upon the sum which was nevertheless un-
earned. In the writer's judgment the decision was correct as
the unearned sum arose out of the position held by decedent
and would not have been received had he not been so employed.
The custom followed here by the company in making this pay-
20. See Lockhart v. Dickey, 161 La. 282, 108 So. 483 (1926); Eberle v.
Eberle, 161 La. 313, 108 So. 549 (1926); Succession of Hogh, 193 La. 260, 190
So. 399 (1939).
21. 209 La. 428, 24 So.(2d) 676 (1946).
22. 209 La. 224, 24 So.(2d) 456 (1946).
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ment is pursued rather generally and might almost be said to
be an increment of the employment which can be anticipated.
This type of payment might be classed with many kinds of pen-
sions, bonuses, et cetera, that are now prevalent under the mod-
ern theory of recompense. If they arise solely from the job held
during marriage certainly it appears logical that they should
fall into the community and be differentiated from some of the
old cases where under a different theory they were indeed gifts.
The second item discussed was the question of whether or
not the community should have depreciation charged against
the returns from the husband's estate. It was conceded that the
jurisprudence was against the charge,23 but was urged that
modern accounting methods warranted the overruling of these
old cases. The court refused to pass on this matter as there was
no proof in the record of the actual depreciation of the separate
property of the husband. It seems strange that the question was
regarded as settled particularly under the cases cited. The Viaud
case,' ninety years old, dealt with an item of $605.02, the value
of movables, certain tools and furniture, separate goods of the
husband at the date of his marriage thirty years before. Article
2371 of the Code of 1825 which was cited in both cases is the
same as the present Article 2402 so far as concerns the first sen-
tence containing the critical word profit. The court in the Viaud
case was also apparently guided by Article 543, now 550, dealing
with usufruct as the husband had enjoyed the usufruct of the
deceased wife's half of the community for a time. The Depas
case,25 ninety-nine years old, dealt also with improvements made
upon separate property with funds of the community and the
court decided that the cost of the improvements was the maxi-
mum credit allowable the community estate. On this point the
case dealt with Article 2408 of course and not with the interpre-
tation of the word "profits" found in Articles 2402-2406. It is un-
fortunate that the court was unable to pass upon this specific
item. However, in considering the next item a fine statement of
one phase of the principle involved appears, which dispels any
fears regarding analysis of gross income and actual profit. The
court said:
"Since the profits of the separate property, under the admin-
istration of the husband, fall into the community, it is but
23. Depas v. Riez, 2 La. Ann. 30 (1847); Succession of Viaud, 11 La. Ann.
297 (1856).
24. Succession of Viaud, 11 La. Ann. 297 (1856).
25. Depas v. Riez, 2 La. Ann. 30 (1847).
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just, equitable and proper that the ordinary expenditures re-
quired in the production of such profits and in the preserva-
tion of the property should be borne by the community."26
Decedent had settled with his second wife upon dissolution of
their marriage by divorce and in partial payment of her one-half
of the community had entered into a contract with her which
classified as an annuity under Articles 2793 and 2800. He prom-
ised to pay five hundred dollars per month until such time as
he was ready to pay the $120,000 owed her in settlement. This
rent or interest charge was properly charged against the com-
munity which had received the gross income from the separate
estate and in connection with this item the clear statement above
quoted was made. Obviously interest on borrowed money used to
produce the gross revenue had to be deducted before an actual
profit could be shown, to which the community could lay just
claim.
Decedent had made substantial gifts to his relatives and to
those of his wife. It was urged that gifts to his family should be
charged to his separate estate, as there must be a presumption
that the donor so intended. In charging them to the dommunity
since only movables were involved and no fraud shown, the
court said:
"Should a presumption exist with reference to the intention
of decedent about the instant item, it, we think, would favor
the charging of the disputed donations to the community
rather than to the corpus of the separate estate. As pointed
out above all of the net profits from decedent's separate prop-
erty belonged to the community and it does not seem likely
that he would have entertained the intention of diminishing
the invested capital that produced those profits. '2T
Succession of Brunies21 also dealt with settlement between
separate and community estates. The claims were those of a
second wife versus children of deceased by a previous marriage.
The decision in the Ratcliff case was controlling and expenses
of the separate estate of the husband were held to have been
properly paid from the rents and revenues of the separate estate
since only the profit therefrom should properly be credited to
the community. The items of expense were insurance and taxes
26. 209 La. 224, 238, 24 So.(2d) 456, 460 (1945).
27. 209 La. 224, 241, 24 So.(2d) 456, 461.
28. 209 La. 629, 25 So.(2d) 287 (1940).
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on the property of the separate estate and interest and principal
of loans secured by property belonging to the separate estate.
Another item in contest was rent upon the house which had
been occupied by deceased and his wife which was willed to
her and in which she had continued to live after her husband's
death. The property belonged to the separate estate of deceased.
The court held that under Articles 1627 and 1628, the widow,
legatee and executrix, did not need to demand possession, that
Article 1631 was inapplicable and that no rent on the house was
due by the widow to the heirs.
After divorce, the former wife sued in Baker v. Baker29 for a
settlement and partition of community property. A piece of land
was claimed by the widow as being community because it had
been acquired during the marriage without any recitation in
the deed to protect title in the husband's separate estate. Parol
evidence was admitted to prove that, by the deed in question,
the property was not acquired, as the transfer was merely to
correct a previous error where a sale had been effected when
only a security transaction was intended by both parties. Kitt-
redge v. Grau,o where stock in a corporation was acquired dur-
ing marriage but with a partnership interest owned before mar-
riage was cited in support of the decision that the property was
separate under a very proper interpretation of the word acquire
found in Article 2402.
The court approved the findings and recommendations of the
commissioner for the Civil District Court for the Parish of Or-
leans in Wainer v. Wainer.31 The recommendations had previ-
ously been approved by the district court. Children of a first
marriage had attempted to gain surrender of their mother's
share of the community together with revenues therefrom ac-
cruing after expiration of the father's legal usufruct terminated
upon his remarriage. Shortly before the death of his first wife,
the father of plaintiffs had formed two corporations, kept en-
tirely within his control, clearly for the purpose of avoiding
succession proceedings upon the anticipated death of his wife.
After her death he liquidated the corporations and later sold all
property that had belonged to them. The principal objections
to the commissioner's report were to his having disregarded the
corporate entities involved in what the court termed an "in-
29. 209 La. 1041, 26 So.(2d) 132 (1946).
30. 158 La. 154, 103 So. 723 (1924).
31. 210 La. 324, 26 So.(2d) 829 (1946).
19471
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
genious manipulation" to diminish the value of the estate of the
wife and mother. The strong statement by the court in approv-
ing the commissioner's action follows:
"We refuse to sanction and approve the method or scheme
adopted by the defendant in his efforts to retain control and
management of the property which rightfully belonged to
his wife's estate, although such procedure may have been
legal, or to sanction and approve his failure to account there-
for after his usufruct had been terminated by his remar-
riage."8 2
The case entitled Succession of Dielmanns held that a perfect
usufruct of bank stock was converted into an imperfect usufruct
of the proceeds therefrom when the change was brought about
by liquidation of tile bank, a matter over which the usufructuary
had no control. This situation was clearly distinguished from





Gulf Refining Company v. Garrett" arose as a concursus
proceeding to determine ownership of royalties. The Court of
Appeal of. the Second Circuit reached a judgment in Gulf Re-
fining Company v. Garrett2 in 1943, which was reversed by the
supreme court and remanded to the district court in 1946. Three
dissents are listed on the first hearing by the supreme court and
two upon the rehearing, the last upon the matter of remanding
without request. While it might be said that no definite conclu-
sions were reached under these circumstances, the discussions
by various members of the court are most interesting and im-
portant since the underlying question is one of interpretation of
the old "mine and quarry article," 552 of the Civil Code, which
appears as follows:
"The usufructuary has a right to the enjoyment and proceeds
of mines and quarries in the land subject to the usufruct, if
* Professor of Civil Law, Louisiana State University.
82. 26 So.(2d) 829, 886 (La. 1946).
38. 119 La. 101, 43 So. 972 (1907).
1. 209 La. 674, 25 So. (2d) 329 (1945).
2. 24 So. (2d) 682 (La. App. 1943).
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